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THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT:
CALCULATING THE “HOURS OF SERVICE” FOR
THE REINSTATED EMPLOYEE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) has drawn the following
commentary by at least one prominent labor and employment lawyer: ―I really
don‘t think there‘s a law out there that is more confusing and causes more
problems for employers than Family Leave.‖ 1 Some of the confusion
experienced by employers involves the interpretation of the language of the
FMLA. However, the problems associated with the FMLA are not limited to
employers, but involve employees and their rights under the FMLA.
Although the FMLA has been in effect for approximately fifteen years, the
law is still unsettled as to how to interpret the ―hours worked‖ language of the
FMLA as it applies to a reinstated employee. The following case is an
example of the problem facing employers, employees, and courts.
Mr. Robert Steele, a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) worker, was
indefinitely suspended and eventually discharged from his employment in
February 2005.2 After a grievance and arbitration hearing, the arbitrator
found that the CTA had no cause to fire Mr. Steele, so Mr. Steele was
reinstated to his former position. 3 The CTA fully reimbursed Mr. Steele for
the pay he would have earned during his discharge.4 Mr. Steele returned to
his former position in November 2005.5
Then, in April 2006, Mr. Steele applied for leave under the FMLA to care
for his asthmatic wife, but the CTA denied his request on the basis that Mr.

1. Katherine Reynolds Lewis, 20% of Employers Violate FMLA, Study Concludes, NEWHOUSE
NEWS
SERVICE,
May
21,
2008,
available
at
http://www.newhouse.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=51901 (quoting Richard
Meneghello, a partner in the Portland, Oregon, office of Fisher & Phillips, a national employment
law firm). The article reports that one in five U.S. employers violates the FMLA, according to a
report by the Families and Work Institute. Id. The potential for confusion in adhering to the
FMLA‘s rules has led to proposed changes to the FMLA rules now pending at the Labor Department.
Id. (citing Lisa Horn, a manager of health care for the Society for Human Resource Management in
Alexandria, Virginia).
2. Savage v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 06 C 1407, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 9, 2007).
3. Id. at *2–3.
4. Id. at *3.
5. Id. Mr. Steele was employed as a bus operator. Id.

174

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:173

Steele had not worked the requisite 1250 hours to qualify for FMLA leave. 6
While Mr. Steele‘s FMLA application was pending, his wife suffered severe
asthma attacks, requiring Mr. Steele to miss four days from work. 7 The CTA
disciplined Mr. Steele for his unauthorized absences. 8 If Mr. Steele had not
been discharged without cause during the previous twelve months, he would
have worked the requisite 1250 hours to qualify for FMLA leave. 9 Mr.
Steele‘s experience raises the question: When an employee has been
wrongfully discharged and then reinstated, should the hours the employee
would have worked, but for the wrongful termination, count toward the 1250
hours required to qualify for FMLA leave? Although the FMLA nears its
fifteenth anniversary,10 courts have yet to resolve this question.
The FMLA provides for an employee to take up to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave in a calendar year for health-related or family-related reasons if
the employee qualifies for the leave by working 1250 hours in the twelve
months prior to the leave request.11 There has been some confusion as to how
courts define the hours of service requirement when an employee has been
wrongfully suspended, laid off, or terminated (and then reinstated) within the
twelve months prior to the leave request. The Sixth Circuit has held that the
hours the employee ―would have‖ worked count toward the requisite 1250
hours, as part of a ―make whole‖ award when reinstating a wrongfully
terminated employee. 12 However, the First Circuit has used the Fair Labor
Standards Act‘s (FLSA) definition of ―work‖ to determine that if an employee
was not actually working, hours he would have worked do not count toward
the 1250 hours required for FMLA leave. 13
This Comment argues that the hours an employee would have worked
during a wrongful termination should count toward the hours needed for
FMLA leave. In Part II, this Comment gives a brief history of the FMLA.
Also, Part II outlines the requirements that need to be met for an employee to
qualify for FMLA leave. Part III goes on to discuss the conflicting case law
interpreting the hours worked language of the FMLA as it relates to the
reinstated employee after a wrongful termination or suspension.
6. Id. Mr. Steele was discharged from full-time employment on February 10, 2005, and
reinstated to his former position on November 18, 2005. Id. at *2–3.
7. Id. at *3.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *4. If Mr. Steele had worked during the time he was discharged, he would have
worked forty-one weeks and a total of 1640 hours. Id. at *5. Even adjusting that time for vacations,
absences, and holidays, Mr. Steele would have worked the minimum 1250 required hours. Id.
10. The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (Supp. V 1993)).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(A), 2612(a)(1) (2000).
12. See Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 605–06 (6th Cir. 2004).
13. See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir. 2002).
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Next, Part IV argues the necessity of including the hours an employee
would have worked during the termination or suspension when calculating
whether the employee qualifies for FMLA leave. This argument is premised,
in part, on the common law and developing labor relations law that require
that an award of damages is limited to the amount that would make the injured
party whole. An employee arguably is not made whole without crediting the
hours that would have been worked. This argument is also premised on the
fact that the FLSA is a remedial statute that courts are directed to look to for
guidance when interpreting the FMLA‘s language. In particular, because the
FLSA was designed with a humanitarian purpose, any ambiguities in its
language should be interpreted in favor of the employee, including the hours
worked language of the FMLA.
Additionally, public policy favors
interpreting the FMLA to include the hours an employee would have worked
because the needs of workers and their families should be protected in an ―at
will‖ employment environment.
Finally, Part V concludes by asserting that including the hours an
employee would have worked is consistent with the goals of Congress when
enacting the FMLA.
II. FMLA BACKGROUND
The following background information regarding the FMLA is necessary
to understand the source of confusion for courts in interpreting the hours
worked requirement. Congress passed the FMLA on February 3, 1993, and
President Clinton signed it into law two days later.14 The FMLA was created
in response to the needs of a growing number of single-parent households,
households with working mothers, and the growing number of households
with elderly persons.15
The FMLA states that an eligible employee is entitled to a total of twelve
work weeks of unpaid leave during any twelve-month period for certain
family or medical reasons, including a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of his job. 16 FMLA leave may be
taken all at once or intermittently. 17
For an employee to be eligible for FMLA leave, he must have been
employed by the employer for at least twelve months and worked at least
1250 hours within the twelve months prior to the leave request. 18 The
14. Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, The Family and Medical Leave Act: Does it Make
Unreasonable Demands on Employers?, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 135, 135–36 (1996).
15. Id. at 135. The FMLA went into effect for most employers on August 5, 1993. Id. at 136.
16. See § 2612(a)(1) (2000).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 825.203 (2006).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2000). In addition, the FMLA applies only to employers with fifty
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employer may request a supporting medical certification of the serious
medical condition from the employee applying for leave. 19 However, an
employer is prohibited from interfering with, restraining, or denying an
employee‘s exercise or attempted exercise of any FMLA right. 20 The FMLA
also prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating or retaliating
against an employee for exercising an FMLA right.21 After the employee‘s
qualified leave ends, the employee is entitled to reinstatement to the position
held before the leave commenced, or an equivalent position with the same pay
and benefits.22
In the years since the FMLA was enacted, courts have interpreted the
language of the FMLA to determine whether wrongfully terminated, and
subsequently reinstated, employees should be able to count the hours they
would have worked toward the calculation of the hours required to qualify for
FMLA leave. When faced with the interpretation of any statute, including the
FMLA, courts must first look to the language of the statute when beginning
the task of interpreting the meaning of specific phrases or words. 23 The
FMLA offers guidance by directing courts to look to the FLSA24 when
interpreting the ―hours of service‖ requirement. 25 When interpreting the
language of the FMLA, courts must try to balance the interests of the
employer with the needs of families when determining eligibility for FMLA
leave. 26 However, balancing the needs of families with the interests of
employers has not brought all courts to the same conclusions, as Part III
illustrates.
III. CONFLICTING CASE LAW INVOLVING THE HOURS OF SERVICE
REQUIREMENT WHEN AN EMPLOYEE IS WRONGFULLY TERMINATED AND
THEN REINSTATED
The cases in Part III illustrate how courts have disagreed in their attempts
to interpret the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement. In some cases, courts
or more employees, within a seventy-five-mile radius, for each working day during each of twenty or
more calendar work weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii), (4)(A)(i).
Some states, such as Connecticut, have lower threshold requirements for taking FMLA leave.
Michael G. Petrie, There’s No Substitute for Hours Worked, 14 CONN. EMP. L. LETTER 3, May 2006.
For instance, in Connecticut, an employee needs to work only 1000 hours, rather than 1250 hours, in
the previous twelve months to qualify for leave. Id.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a)–(b) (2000).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000).
21. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2000).
23. See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 2002).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(C) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2000).
26. Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 2004).
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have used the FLSA‘s interpretation of work to justify either allowing or
disallowing the hours an employee would have worked but for a wrongful
termination. 27 In other cases, courts have balanced the interests of employers
and employees when interpreting the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement to
determine whether to include the hours an employee would have worked but
for a wrongful termination.28 The First and Sixth Circuits have split as to
whether to include hours an employee would have worked but for a wrongful
termination, and each offers reasonable justification for its conclusions. 29 One
tribal court and several district courts have weighed in on this issue as well,
with differing results.30 As the following case law demonstrates, the issue
continues to polarize courts, employers, and employees.
A. The First Circuit Excludes Hours That an Employee Does Not Actually
Work in Plumley v. Southern Container, Inc.31
In Plumley, a case of first impression decided by the First Circuit, the
plaintiff, John Plumley, was discharged from his job at Southern Container,
Inc. (SCI), when he missed work to care for his ailing father. 32 Plumley
claimed that SCI violated his rights under the FMLA by firing him for taking
leave to care for his sick father.33 SCI claimed that Plumley did not qualify
for FMLA leave because he had not worked the requisite 1250 hours in the
previous twelve months.34 In calculating the hours of service to qualify for

27. See, e.g., Plumley, 303 F.3d at 369–70.
28. See, e.g., Ricco, 377 F.3d at 603.
29. See generally id. (holding that a reinstated employee is entitled to count the hours the
employee would have worked to qualify for FMLA leave because otherwise the employee is not
made whole); Plumley, 303 F.3d 364 (holding that the reinstated employee must actually work hours
to qualify for leave because the wording of the FLSA requires such an interpretation).
30. See generally Barthelet v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004181
(Mashantucket
Pequot
Mar.
15,
2006),
available
at
http://www.tribalinstitute.org/opinions/2006.NAMP.0000002.htm (holding that an employee must actually work to be
credited with hours that would make the employee eligible for family leave).
31. 303 F.3d 364.
32. Id. at 367. Prior to missing work to care for his ill father, Plumley had been discharged in
March 1998. Id. After following the company‘s grievance procedure and participating in arbitration,
Plumley was reinstated with full pay and benefits for a six-month span of time during which he
performed no work for SCI. Id. Once reinstated, the plant manager notified Plumley that Plumley
needed to return to work on October 12, 1998. Id. Plumley had taken a job at a nightclub during the
time he had been discharged and while he was awaiting the arbitral award and requested more time to
find a replacement for himself at the nightclub. Id. at 367 n.2. The plant manager ―was unmoved by
Plumley‘s plight.‖ Id. Plumley reported for work on October 12, 1998, but left prior to the end of
his shift. Id. at 367. The next day Plumley notified SCI that he would not be in for his shift because
he was visiting his ill father at the hospital. Id. Plumley was fired upon his return to work on
October 14 for abandoning his duties. Id.
33. Id. at 368.
34. Id.
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the FMLA leave, Plumley claimed that SCI did not include all the hours he
should have been credited. 35 Earlier in the year, prior to his discharge,
Plumley had been wrongfully discharged, and after filing a grievance with the
union and pursuant to an arbitral award, he was reinstated with pay for the
hours he missed during the time he was wrongfully discharged. 36 Plumley
claimed that the hours for which he was paid pursuant to the arbitral award
should count toward the hours of service for purposes of qualifying for FMLA
leave. 37
The First Circuit determined that the resolution of the dispute hinged upon
the interpretation of the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement.38 The court
first looked to the language of the statute for guidance. 39 Determining
whether an employee has worked the required 1250 hours, the First Circuit
noted that the FMLA directs courts to examine the principles established
under the FLSA for determining compensable hours of work. 40
The First Circuit noted that the Supreme Court defined ―work‖ under the
FLSA to mean ―physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not)
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily
for the benefit of the employer.‖41 The court stated that this definition of
―work‖ was the ―yardstick‖ by which courts should measure all FLSA
claims.42
In addition, the First Circuit looked at the plain and commonly understood
meaning of the word ―work.‖ The court stated that ―courts should assume that
Congress knew, and embraced, widely accepted legal definitions of specific
words used in drafting particular statutes.‖43 The court went on to say that
35. Id.
36. Id. at 367.
37. Id. at 368.
38. Id. at 369. Plumley had only actually performed 851.25 hours of work for SCI in the
previous twelve months prior to leaving to care for his sick father. Id. Without being credited with
the hours he would have worked but for his six-month absence incurred during the arbitration and
grievance procedure, he would not have qualified for FMLA leave. See id.
39. Id. The court stated:
Thus, statutory interpretation always begins with the text of the relevant
statutes—and it sometimes ends there as well. When the statutory language
―points unerringly in a single direction, and produces an entirely plausible
result, it is unnecessary—and improper—to look for other signposts or to
browse in the congressional archives.‖
Id. (quoting United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir. 1987)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 370–71 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944)).
42. Id. at 371 n.4.
43. Id. at 370 (citing United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 2001)).
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―[f]or legal purposes, the standard definition of ‗employment‘ is ‗[w]ork for
which one has been hired and is being paid by an employer.‘‖44 The court
stated that ―work‖ was defined in its verb form, meaning to ―‗exert effort; to
perform, either physically or mentally.‘‖ 45 Finally, the court concluded that:
Merging these definitions into one coherent sentence, we find
that the statutory language, in every technical sense, indicates
that only those hours that an employer suffers or permits an
employee to do work (that is, to exert effort, either physically
or mentally) for which that employee has been hired and is
being paid by the employer can be included as hours of
service within the meaning of the FMLA.46
In Plumley, the employee was denied FMLA leave because he did not
meet the required 1250 hours within the previous twelve months. 47 The First
Circuit, using the Supreme Court‘s definition of ―work,‖ held that the required
hours under the FMLA had to be hours ―actually worked,‖ rather than hours
the employee could have worked but for the wrongful termination.48
B. Connecticut’s Tribal Court Follows the First Circuit’s Reasoning in
Barthelet v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise49
In a subsequent case that followed the reasoning of the First Circuit,
Barthelet v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, the court held that the
wording of the FLSA required an employee to actually work to qualify for
FMLA leave. In Barthelet, the employee worked for the Foxwoods Resort
and Casino.50 She was absent from work from December 25, 2000, to June
11, 2001, on workers‘ compensation leave for neck and shoulder injuries. 51
After returning to work, she took additional time off from January 30, 2002,
to February 10, 2002, for continued pain in her shoulder. 52 Later that same
year, she suffered from kidney stones, requiring an additional absence from
work from February 13, 2002, to March 20, 2002.53 Although she requested

44. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (7th ed. 1999)).
45. Id. (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1599).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 372.
48. Id.
49. No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 (Mashantucket Pequot Mar. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/2006.NAMP.0000002.htm.
50. Petrie, supra note 17 (discussing Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 ¶ 10).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Family Medical Leave under the tribal policy54 twice during 2002, she was
denied because she did not have the requisite 1250 hours accumulated to
qualify for leave. 55 Eventually, she was fired for excessive absences. 56
Barthelet appealed her dismissal, claiming that the Tribe should have
granted her Family Medical Leave request. 57 She further argued that her
workers‘ compensation leave was a mitigating factor in her inability to work
the requisite 1250 hours required for family leave. 58 Barthelet, therefore,
claimed that her being out on workers‘ compensation leave qualified as
―hours worked‖ under the tribal Family Medical Leave policy. 59
The court looked to both the First Circuit‘s Plumley v. Southern
Container, Inc.60 and the Sixth Circuit‘s Ricco v. Potter61 for guidance when it
evaluated the plaintiff‘s claims because the Tribe‘s Family Medical Leave
policy mirrored the FMLA‘s language. 62 The court determined that the
reasoning in Ricco, specifically that the hours an employee would have
worked but for a wrongful termination or suspension should count toward the
hours needed for FMLA leave, did not apply because the Tribe had not
unlawfully terminated the plaintiff in Barthelet, and that the finding in Ricco
was based upon the employee‘s unlawful termination.63 The court premised
its conclusion by noting that the Ricco court stated that not including the
hours the unlawfully terminated employee would have worked ―would
‗reward employers for their unlawful conduct.‘‖64
Then the Barthelet court stated that the First Circuit‘s definition of hours
of service in Plumley was consistent with the Gaming Enterprise‘s exclusion
of the workers‘ compensation leave hours in calculating the 1250 hours
required for Family Medical Leave. 65 The court also noted that the plain
language of the FLSA, specifically the exclusions for illness, vacation, and
holiday, from the hours of service definition, even when employees are paid

54. Tribal Family Medical Leave follows federal law in that an eligible employee is one who
has been employed at least twelve months and has worked at least 1250 hours during the previous
twelve-month period. Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 ¶ 27.
55. Petrie, supra note 17 (discussing Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181).
56. Id.
57. Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 ¶ 10.
58. Id. ¶ 11.
59. Id.
60. See 303 F.3d 364 (1st Cir. 2002); supra Part III.A.
61. See 377 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004); infra Part III.C.
62. Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 ¶¶ 27, 29.
63. Id. ¶ 31.
64. Id. (quoting Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2004)).
65. Id. ¶ 30.
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for that time, did not support including the hours an employee spent on
workers‘ compensation leave.66
Even though the tribal court‘s decision is not binding on the state or
federal courts in Connecticut, this decision may be indicative of how a similar
case would be decided in Connecticut.67 This decision reflects the ―no work =
no leave‖ line of thinking by some courts, and adds yet another twist to the
knot of opinions surrounding the hours of service requirement of the FMLA. 68
C. The Sixth Circuit Includes the Hours an Employee Would Have Worked in
Ricco v. Potter 69
In Ricco v. Potter, the Sixth Circuit confronted the same task of
interpreting the hours of service requirement of the FMLA but came to the
opposite conclusion.70 In Ricco, the employee, after working for the United
States Postal Service for approximately four and a half years, was issued a
notice of removal that terminated her employment. 71 The employee filed a
grievance through her union, and after an arbitration hearing, her termination
was converted into a thirty-work-day suspension. 72 The award ordered the
employee to be ―made whole,‖ including reinstatement, back pay, and ―full
credit for years of service for seniority and pension purposes.‖ 73
After being reinstated pursuant to the make-whole award, the employee
required intermittent leaves of absence because she began to experience
depression and migraines due to the death of her husband. 74 Because of this
health condition, the employee requested FMLA leave, but her employer
denied her request and claimed she had not worked the required 1250 hours. 75
Consequently, the employee was issued another notice of removal for failing
to keep a regular work schedule. 76 Although the employee filed a grievance,
claiming her FMLA rights had been violated, she was terminated, and the
arbitrator stated that the arbitration hearing was not the proper forum to

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. ¶ 28.
Petrie, supra note 18.
See id.
377 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 600.
Id. at 600–01.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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litigate any FMLA violations.77 The employee then commenced an action in
federal court.78
When the case went up on appeal, 79 the Sixth Circuit looked to the FLSA
to define the hours of service requirement of the FMLA. 80 The court noted
that the applicable subsection of the FLSA dealt with pay rates.81 The court
pointed out that the FLSA specifically states that an employee‘s ―regular rate‖
of compensation does not include the following:
payments made for occasional periods when no work is
performed due to vacation, holiday, illness, failure of the
employer to provide sufficient work, or other similar cause;
reasonable payments for traveling expenses, or other
expenses, incurred by an employee in the furtherance of his
employer‘s interests and properly reimbursable by the
employer; and other similar payments to an employee which
are not made as compensation for his hours of
employment[.]82
The Sixth Circuit, interpreting the FLSA language, held that the FLSA
phrase ―other similar cause‖ found in § 207 meant things like jury duty,
inability of the employee to reach the workplace due to weather conditions,
and a funeral of a family member, but not absences due to unlawful
termination. 83 Also, the court stated that although ―regular rate‖ excludes
payment for certain periods where an employee performs no work due to
certain causes, unlawful termination should not be considered one of the
causes.84 The Sixth Circuit interpreted the FLSA‘s language not to exclude
hours that would have been worked but for the employee‘s unlawful
termination and held that the employee was entitled to include those hours
when requesting FMLA leave.85 In Ricco, the employee argued that the court
needed to include the hours an employee would have worked but for a
wrongful termination in order to effectuate the FMLA‘s goal to balance the
demands of the workplace with the needs of families and discourage
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. At the district level, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at
Cleveland granted the employer‘s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and the employee appealed. Id. at 600.
80. Id. at 604.
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (2000)).
83. Id. at 605.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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employers from terminating employees for the purpose of restricting
employees‘ eligibility to take FMLA leave. 86
D. The Eastern District of Arkansas Uses the Sixth Circuit’s Reasoning to
Deny Summary Judgment in Densmore v. Pilgrim‘s Pride Corp.87
In Densmore, the case was before the court on a motion for summary
judgment. 88 The defendant denied the employee FMLA leave due to a
shortage of the required ―hours of service.‖ 89 The employee claimed that she
did not meet the 1250 hours required because she had been unlawfully
suspended after an injury to her hand that required her to miss work and then
had been reinstated. 90 Months later, when she requested FMLA leave for her
pregnancy, her employer denied her request. 91 She was later fired for taking
unauthorized leave. 92 The court pointed out that a jury could find that the first
unlawful termination constituted illegal interference with the employee‘s
FMLA rights and may not be used as a justification for the second
termination. 93 The court, in denying the employer‘s summary judgment
motion, went on to note that a jury could find that but for the unlawful
suspension, the employee would have met the ―hours of service‖ requirement
under the FMLA.94
E. The Northern District of Illinois Uses the Sixth Circuit’s Reasoning to
Determine an Employee’s FMLA Eligibility in Savage v. Chicago Transit
Authority95
In Savage v. Chicago Transit Authority,96 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed a motion to dismiss brought by
the CTA.97 The CTA claimed that Mr. Steele was not an eligible employee
because he had not worked the requisite 1250 hours to qualify for the FMLA;
Mr. Steele argued that he would have worked the required hours but for his

86. Id. at 603. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court to
determine Ricco‘s eligibility for FMLA leave, directing the court to include the hours she would
have worked but for her wrongful termination. Id. at 606.
87. No. 4:05CV00770-WRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82285 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 9, 2006).
88. Id. at *1.
89. Id. at *3–4.
90. Id. at *2–3.
91. See id. at *3–4.
92. Id. at *3.
93. Id. at *23–24.
94. Id.
95. No. 06 C 1407, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2007).
96. See supra Part I (reviewing the facts of the case).
97. Savage, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *1.
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wrongful termination and subsequent reinstatement. 98 The court stated that
although the FMLA does not precisely define hours of service, it directs
litigants to § 207 of the FLSA to determine whether an employee has met the
hours of service requirement of the FMLA. 99 The court observed that
―[u]nder § 207 of the FLSA, the ‗regular rate at which an employee is
employed shall be deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid
to, or on behalf of, the employee.‘‖100 The court then went on to note that Mr.
Steele‘s allegations were factually analogous to the plaintiff‘s allegations in
Ricco.101 The court stated that had the CTA credited the hours that Mr. Steele
would have worked but for his wrongful discharge, he would have qualified
for the FMLA leave, much like the plaintiff in Ricco. 102
The court went on to adopt the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, stating that:
―[T]he goal of a make-whole award is to put the
employee in the same position that she would have been in
had her employer not engaged in the unlawful conduct[;] this
includes giving the employee credit towards the FMLA‘s
hours-of-service requirement for hours that the employee
would have worked but for her unlawful termination.‖103
The court held that because of Mr. Steele‘s make-whole award, he was an
eligible employee under the FMLA. 104 In addition, the court found the
reasoning in Plumley unpersuasive because the language of § 207 of the
FLSA defines only the regular rate of compensation for an employee, not
what constitutes ―work.‖105 The court went on to say that a person who
receives a make-whole award pursuant to arbitration following wrongful
discharge receives ―compensation‖ within the definition given in the FLSA. 106
IV. THE NECESSITY OF INCLUDING THE HOURS AN EMPLOYEE WOULD HAVE
WORKED WHEN CALCULATING WHETHER AN EMPLOYEE QUALIFIES FOR
FMLA LEAVE
Although courts disagree on how to interpret the hours worked
requirement, courts should interpret the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id. at *4.
100. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (2000)).
101. Id. at *7.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2004)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at *8.
106. Id. at *8–9.

2008]

CALCULATING FMLA “HOURS OF SERVICE”

185

to include hours an employee would have worked but for the employer‘s
unlawful termination for several important reasons. First, when an employee
has been wrongfully terminated and then reinstated pursuant to an employer‘s
―make-whole‖ award, the only way an employee is truly made ―whole‖ is if
the employee retains all the benefits he would have received had he never
been wrongfully terminated. Next, because an ambiguity exists in how the
FMLA is defined by the FLSA, courts should resolve the confusion by
creating a bright-line rule that in turn may reduce future litigation as it relates
to this specific issue. Finally, when balancing the needs of employers and
employees when interpreting the FMLA, courts should include the hours an
employee would have worked but for a wrongful termination for the purpose
of prohibiting unlawful terminations of employees by employers who are
looking to circumvent an employee‘s FMLA leave.
A. The Make-Whole Requirement
One reason that courts should interpret the hours of service requirement to
include hours a wrongfully terminated employee would have worked is to
make an injured employee whole. Many employers, such as the United States
Postal Service in Ricco107 and the CTA in Savage,108 use labor arbitration to
settle disputes between the labor force and management. 109 Many collective
bargaining contracts provide for grievance resolution through a formal
process that concludes with binding arbitration. 110 When parties empower an
arbitrator to resolve the grievance, the arbitrator has the authority to grant
relief for violations of the contract where the arbitrator finds the grievance has
merit.111
Arbitrators have a broad scope of power to provide a remedy to
disputing parties.112 However, the ordinary rule arbitrators follow comes from
the common law and from the developing law of labor relations, specifically
that an award of damages is limited to the amount that would make the injured
party whole. 113 Unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitrators follow this

107. Ricco, 377 F.3d at 601.
108. Savage, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *2–3.
109. See Stephen B. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining
Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 270, 271 (1982) (discussing the labor
arbitration process).
110. Id.
111. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 1200 (Alan
Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003).
112. Id. In spite of this power to remedy disputes, arbitrators do not always award monetary
damages for contract violations. Id. at 1200–01. In addition, arbitrators are often reluctant to offer
compensation for time an employee has not worked. Id. at 1201.
113. Id.
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rule. 114 Attempting to make an injured party whole usually involves awarding
―monetary damages to place the parties in the position they would have been
in had there been no violation.‖115
Make-whole awards can include monetary compensation for lost
overtime, premium pay, and other types of special pay an employee may have
been denied while he or she was laid off or fired. 116 Awarding monetary
compensation generally corresponds to the injured party‘s out-of-pocket
expenses, as well as other money losses. 117 However, remedial make-whole
awards are not limited to monetary compensation alone. 118 Some arbitrators
award compensation other than money, such as academic credit, sick leave, or
vacation time, as part of the make-whole award.119 In some cases, such as
Ricco and Savage, employees have been reinstated with full benefits and back
pay, as part of the make-whole award determined by arbitration. 120
In Ricco, the arbitrator ordered that Ricco was to be ―made whole.‖ 121
The Sixth Circuit determined that excluding the hours that Ricco would have
worked but for the wrongful termination would not make her ―whole‖;
therefore, those hours must be included in the calculation of hours required
for the subsequent FMLA leave request.122 Likewise, in Savage, the Northern
District of Illinois determined that Steele, the employee, would not be made
whole without crediting the hours Steele would have worked had he not been
wrongfully discharged.123
Courts should include the hours an employee would have worked if he
had not been wrongfully discharged or terminated because to do so comports
with the goal of making the wronged employee whole.
Monetary
compensation alone seems inadequate in many instances, as demonstrated by
the aforementioned case law. To exclude the hours an employee would have
worked from the FMLA eligibility calculation does not truly make the
employee whole. The hours an employee would have worked have value
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1202.
116. Id. An employee may be compensated for time spent traveling to a special assignment.
Id. (footnote omitted). In addition, if an employee was laid off during the time when he may have
received a contract-signing bonus, the arbitrator may award that as part of the make-whole award as
well. Id.
117. Id. at 1205.
118. Id. at 1202–03.
119. Id. at 1202 n.69. Another example includes requiring the employer to provide insurance
coverage for retired employees. Id. at 1203 n.80.
120. Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 601 (6th Cir. 2004); Savage v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 06 C
1407, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2007).
121. Ricco, 377 F.3d at 601.
122. Id. at 600, 605–06.
123. Savage, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *6–9.
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beyond what those hours are worth monetarily. Those hours represent
seniority, retirement benefits, pension benefits, and here, eligibility for FMLA
leave. 124
The arbitrator in Ricco reinstated Ricco with ―full credit for years of
service for seniority and pension purposes.‖ 125 The court noted that often in
back-pay awards an employer compensates an employee for overtime work
the employee would have performed (but did not) as a result of the
―employer‘s violation of employment laws.‖ 126 Even the court in Plumley
acknowledged that the employee received compensation in the arbitration
award for lost wages and benefits.127 Compensation for lost wages is payment
for hours the employee would have worked, but did not, due to the violation
of employment laws by the employer. To allow an employee to be paid for
work he has not performed, and include those hours in calculating pension or
retirement benefits, yet exclude the hours from calculating eligibility for
FMLA leave is incongruous. Adhering to the principle of making an injured
employee whole requires crediting those hours to the injured employee, and
whatever benefit they represent, whether the benefit involves retirement plans,
pension plans, seniority, or the calculation of an employee‘s eligibility for
leave under the FMLA.
B. Ambiguity in How the FLSA Defines the FMLA—Open to Interpretation
Another reason courts should include the hours a wrongfully terminated
employee would have worked in determining FMLA eligibility is that the
FLSA seems ambiguous as it relates to this issue, and any ambiguities should
be resolved in favor of the employee. Congress enacted the FLSA in June
1938,128 and the FLSA remains the most important wage and hour legislation
ever written. 129 The FLSA has three main parts. Along with establishing a
minimum wage, it also requires employers to pay their employees a premium

124. See Ricco, 377 F.3d at 600, 605–06 (demonstrating that a make-whole award recognizes
the value of hours worked beyond their monetary value).
125. Id. at 601 (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 605.
127. Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 367 (1st Cir. 2002).
128. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060; Jennifer
Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 535
(2001).
129. See id. When Congress enacted the FLSA, President Franklin Roosevelt declared that the
FLSA was ―perhaps ‗the most . . . far-sighted program [adopted] for the benefit of workers.‘‖ Id.
(quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Party Primaries (June 24, 1938), in THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 391, 392 (Macmillian 1941)).
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rate for overtime work. 130 In addition, the Act imposes child labor limits on
employers.131
According to § 202(a) of the FLSA, the Act‘s purpose is to improve the
conditions detrimental to workers‘ minimum standard of living.132 The Act
seeks to improve conditions that are necessary for health, general well-being,
and efficiency.133 Congress enacted the FLSA as part of the humanitarian
legislation that was adopted during the Great Depression, and the Act has a
remedial purpose. 134 The Supreme Court, in Tennessee Coal, Iron and
Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123,135 explained that the FLSA provides
no precise statutory definition of work or employment. 136 However, the Court
stated that because the FLSA is a remedial statute and humanitarian in its
purpose, the FLSA should not be interpreted narrowly or applied
grudgingly. 137 The Court stated that the FLSA was designed to protect the
rights of workers who ―sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to
the use and profit of others.‖138
The FMLA directs courts to § 207 of the FSLA when interpreting whether
a worker has met the ―hours of service‖ requirement. 139 In addition, the Code
of Federal Regulations 140 specifically states that the FLSA gives no definition
of ―work‖ but only a partial definition of ―hours of service‖ as it relates to
clothes-changing and wash-up time. 141 Also, the Code of Federal Regulations
states that courts are to provide the ultimate interpretation of the FLSA. 142
As a result, the FLSA contains an ambiguity as to the interpretation and
definition of ―work.‖143 The FMLA offers no clarification when it directs
130. Id.
131. Id. at 535–36.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000).
133. Id.
134. Clemons, supra note 128, at 553.
135. 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
136. Id. at 597.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(C) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(c) (2006).
140. The Code of Federal Regulations ―is the codification of the general and permanent rules
published in the Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the Federal
Government. . . . Each volume of the CFR is updated once each calendar year and is issued on a
quarterly
basis.‖
Code
of
Federal
Regulations
(CFR):
Main
Page,
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
141. 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (2006).
142. 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 (2006).
143. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944), superseded
in part by Portal-to-Portal Act, Pub. L. No. 80-49, Ch. 52, 61 Stat. 86 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 254
(2000)), as recognized in Kitchen v. WSCO Petroleum Corp., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1152 (D. Or.
2007).
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litigants to the FLSA to define ―work.‖144 Because the Code of Federal
Regulations directs the courts to interpret the FLSA, the question becomes
how the courts will interpret this ambiguity. As demonstrated by the
conflicting case law, 145 the definition of work determines the FMLA
eligibility of a wrongfully terminated, and subsequently reinstated, employee.
In Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Co., the Supreme Court gave
guidance to courts when interpreting the FLSA. 146 The Supreme Court
admonished courts to construe the FLSA in a humanitarian fashion, not
grudgingly. 147 Applying a broad interpretation to the FMLA‘s hours of
service requirement seems consistent with both the Code of Federal
Regulations and the Supreme Court‘s admonishment in Tennessee Coal, and
allows for the FLSA‘s humanitarian purpose to be accomplished. 148
Interpreting the hours of service requirement to include the hours a
wrongfully terminated employee would have worked but for the wrongful
termination reflects more accurately the Court‘s interpretation of the FLSA in
Tennessee Coal.149
The argument has been made that the FLSA should no longer enjoy the
broad construction of its terms that courts have allowed in the past.150 Part of
the argument is that because the nation no longer has the widespread
unemployment problem of the Great Depression, the history and the purpose
of the FLSA are inapplicable to current labor and employment issues. 151
Consequently, the FLSA has changed little over the years, while the
workplace has changed considerably from when the FLSA was enacted,
leaving courts to wonder if the remedial and humanitarian purpose has any
validity in today‘s workplace.152
Although technological advances and the global economy have changed
the face of the modern workplace, and workers no longer live in the lean
times of the Great Depression, the argument that courts should more narrowly
construe the FLSA as a result does not recognize the challenges faced by a
modern workforce. Considering the fact that more of the American workforce
is being replaced by foreign workers,153 and more of the products that
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
replacing

Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 2004).
See supra Part III.
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 321 U.S. at 597.
Id.
See Clemons, supra note 128, at 553.
See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R Co., 321 U.S. at 597.
See Clemons, supra note 128, at 554.
Id.
See id. at 556.
The Chicago Tribune reported that digital technology and low-paid foreign workers are
workers in jobs that pay well but do not necessarily require a college degree. Michael

190

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:173

compete for the American dollar are manufactured by foreign countries, 154 the
workplace is becoming an increasingly unpredictable place. Even though the
FLSA was enacted over sixty years ago, its purpose and history have validity
and are applicable to today‘s workers. In light of the changes in the
workforce in the last sixty-plus years, courts should acknowledge that those
changes reinforce the reasons why the FLSA should be liberally construed to
protect today‘s workers, as it has protected past workers, especially as the
FLSA is interpreted to better define the language of the FMLA.
C. Public Policy Arguments: Balancing the Needs of Employers and
Employees When Interpreting the FMLA
Public policy arguments support each side of the FMLA‘s hours worked
controversy. On the one hand, public policy favors employers and their needs
in order for employers to be competitive in the global marketplace. On the
other hand, public policy favors supporting stable families, especially
considering the ever-changing face of the American family. The following
public policy arguments show the issues involved when a court must balance
the needs of employers and employees when interpreting the FMLA.
Ultimately, courts should interpret the hours worked requirement as it relates
to wrongfully terminated, reinstated employees in favor of employees because
of their more vulnerable position as compared to employers. In addition,
favoring the needs of employees seems congruent with the purposes and
intent of Congress when enacting the FMLA.
1. Considering the Needs of the Employers When Interpreting the FMLA
When looking at the FMLA from the employer‘s perspective, an
employment law attorney stated that ―it‘s probably the most employer-hostile
piece of legislation there is.‖155 The FMLA has also been described as a
―nightmare‖ for employers who are trying to adhere to its requirements.156 In
addition, an employer who tries to conserve valuable resources and set a good
example for other employees has little recourse against an inadequate
employee who holds up the FMLA as a shield against termination or a
disciplinary action.157

Oneal, Look High and Look Low to Find Next Year’s Jobs, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 26, 2004, Zone C, at 3.
In addition, in a computerized world, employers are increasingly using ―bits and bytes‖ to produce a
greater number of goods and services with fewer people. Id.
154. See id.
155. See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 138.
156. Id. at 139.
157. See id. at 139–40.
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Another strike against employers, related to the FMLA, is that it puts
employers at a disadvantage if an FMLA case goes to trial.158 Juries are very
often composed of an employee‘s peers, rather than fellow employers. 159
Plaintiffs win the vast majority of jury trials because of the bias in
employment litigation. 160 An employer will likely have a better outcome by
avoiding litigation. 161
Interpreting the hours of service requirement to include the hours an
employee would have worked during a wrongful termination may further
disadvantage the employer in favor of the employee. The FMLA specifically
states that the goal of the FMLA is to balance the needs of the employer and
the employee, 162 yet there is little evidence in the way of case law that shows
support for employers when interpreting the FMLA‘s hours of service
requirement. Apart from Plumley and Barthelet, most courts that have
weighed in on this issue have sided with the employee. 163 Employers may
feel that in a balancing act involving the FMLA, the scales are dramatically
tipped to the employees‘ side.
However, if employment is viewed through the lens of the common law
―at will‖ employment concept, the scales seem more heavily tipped in favor of
the employer. The idea of employment at will gives the employer the
discretion to hire and discharge employees for the benefit of the employer. 164
When looking at the history of employment and the power position employers
have enjoyed, the FMLA and the FLSA seem necessary to give employees at
least a modicum of job security and stability.165 Interpreting the hours of
service requirement to include the hours a wrongfully terminated employee
would have worked follows naturally if courts continue to protect employees.
Courts can protect the interests of the employer when they strictly enforce
the statutory numerical limits under the FMLA. 166 In Plumley, the court
deferred to the legislative boundaries set by Congress in requiring an
employee to accrue 1250 hours of service before becoming eligible for FMLA
leave. 167 The court found that interpreting the phrase ―hours of service‖ to
mean hours of ―actual‖ work fit within Congress‘s purposes in passing the

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See id. at 142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137–38.
E.g., Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 600 (6th Cir. 2004).
See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 137 n.23.
See id. at 137.
See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir. 2002).
Id.
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FMLA.168 The court went on to note that if Congress had wanted to include
unproductive time spent by an employee pursuing a grievance, it could have
written the FMLA statute to include those hours. 169 Accordingly, the Plumley
court reasoned that because Congress did not specifically address those
unproductive hours, the court refused to read those hours into the meaning of
the hours of service requirement.170
Employers would argue that courts have difficulty in making a ―principled
distinction between wages received for hours not worked because an
employer has failed to provide sufficient work and wages received for hours
not worked because an employer unjustifiably has kept the employee from
working (and, thus, has failed to provide sufficient work).‖171 Because of this
difficulty, the employers would argue that courts may find that the hours of
service requirement must include only hours ―actually‖ worked. 172 In
Plumley, the court looked at the FLSA‘s language to interpret the FMLA‘s
phrase ―hours of service.‖173 Among the FLSA‘s exclusions from the regular
rate for employment were wages paid for failure by the employer to provide
the employee with regular work.174 The court in Plumley reasoned that the
back pay and benefits received by the employee for the time he spent
unlawfully suspended was consistent with the language in the FLSA that
excluded those hours from counting toward an employee‘s regular rate and
precluded those hours from counting toward an FMLA claim. 175
In addition, employers may claim that if courts allow employees to use the
hours they ―could have‖ worked, rather than hours they ―actually‖ worked,
courts will be expanding the meaning of hours of service beyond what
Congress intended when enacting the FMLA. Employers may claim that a
broad interpretation of hours of service unreasonably favors the employee‘s
needs over the employer‘s interests. In addition, employers would argue that
courts should consider that an employer‘s success in the marketplace, which
in turn translates into more jobs for workers, is dependant upon a reliable
168. Id.
169. Id. Plumley argued here that Congress‘s intent in requiring 1250 hours of work was to
protect employers from having to provide part-time workers with FMLA coverage and only cover
full-time workers. Id. The court in Plumley found that the argument was not based upon solid
footing in that Congress chose to differentiate between eligible and ineligible employees by requiring
a certain number of hours worked in the previous twelve months. Id. Further, the court in Plumley
did not want to usurp Congress‘s policy-making authority by replacing legislative judgment with
judicial judgment. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 370.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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workforce. If courts credit employees with hours they have not ―actually‖
worked, the reliability of employers‘ workforces will be undermined, forcing
employers to hold open jobs that could be filled by workers who will help
strengthen companies and help create a more stable economy.
2. Considering the Needs of Employees When Interpreting the FMLA
Congress specifically enacted the FMLA out of an acknowledgment that
the changing face of society‘s workforce required an added measure of
protection for the needs of workers with families. 176 The growth of singleparent homes, the workforce taking retirement at later ages, and the needs of
fathers staying at home to help with new infants all contributed to the
formation of the FMLA.177 The structure and purpose of the FMLA would be
unnecessary if employers were completely benevolent in meeting their
employees‘ needs. However, while employers are not always amenable to
employee needs, employers are not necessarily tyrants. In reality, employers
generally try to run successful businesses in a competitive, global
marketplace.178 The FMLA provides a structure and a framework for ensuring
that employees can take the time they may require when a family or medical
need necessitates their absence from work. However, the FMLA is a
―federally mandated exception to the common law concept of employment at
will‖179 and holds the employer accountable to act scrupulously toward those
employees who need FMLA leave.
Congress‘s intent in enacting the FMLA was ―to balance the demands of
the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and
economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving
family integrity.‖180 Congress specifically stressed that the goal of the FMLA
was to promote and protect the financial security of families and linked the
security of families with the interests of the nation. 181 Although Congress
176. See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 135.
177. See id. at 135–38.
178. See Doebele v. Sprint Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1220 n.36 (D. Kan. 2001) (quoting
Henry v. Guest Servs., Inc., 902 F. Supp. 245, 253–54 (D.D.C. 1995)). In Doebele, an employment
discrimination case involving the ADA and the FMLA, the court commented that employees cannot
use Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints to interfere with employers‘ rights to
terminate an employee who is not adequately performing. Id. The court went on to state that if
poorly performing employees were required to stay on an employer‘s payroll, businesses would not
be able to compete in the global marketplace. Id.
179. See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 137. ―Although employment at will is still the
presumptive rule of law governing employer-employee relationships, ‗trends on the national level,
confirm the decline of employment at will as inflexible doctrine.‘‖ Id. at 137 n.23 (quoting Robert J.
Aalberts & Lorne Seidman, The Employment at Will Doctrine: Nevada’s Struggle Demonstrates the
Need for Reform, 43 LAB. L.J. 651, 651–52 (1992)).
180. Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 137–38.
181. Id.
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recognized a need to balance the needs of the workplace with the needs of
families,182 the fact that Congress did not address the need to protect the
economic security of employers may show that Congress was acknowledging
the power position that employers hold over their employees. This should be
a message to courts that when interpreting the FMLA, protecting families is a
foremost concern, whether the interpretation involves the hours of service
requirement or any other provision of the FMLA.
In Ricco, the employee argued that the court needed to balance the
demands of the workplace with the needs of families and to discourage
employers from terminating employees for the purpose of restricting
employees‘ eligibility to take FMLA leave. 183 The court agreed and stated
that if hours that an employee would have worked were not included in the
calculation of the requisite 1250 hours needed to qualify for FMLA leave,
employers would be rewarded for their unlawful conduct.184 The court in
Ricco followed the intent of Congress to protect families‘ financial security
and the national interest in the integrity of families by sending the clear
message to employers that interfering with the FMLA rights of employees
would not be allowed. 185
Likewise, in Densmore, when the court denied summary judgment on the
basis that a jury could find that the employee‘s first unlawful termination
interfered with the employee‘s right to take FMLA leave, the court aligned
itself with the intent of Congress to protect families. 186
The court in Savage also demonstrated the intent of Congress when it
determined that the employee‘s hours of service should include the hours the
employee would have worked but for the termination without cause within the
prior twelve months. 187
Conversely, the court in Plumley took the position of protecting the
employer, rather than protecting families by interpreting the hours of service
requirement to exclude the hours the employee would have worked while
participating in the company‘s grievance procedure. 188 Although the court
acknowledged the employee‘s argument that the purpose of the FMLA is a
remedial one to protect employees, the court went on to dismiss the argument

182. Id.
183. Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 2004).
184. Id. at 605.
185. See id. at 600.
186. See Densmore v. Pilgrim‘s Pride Corp., No. 4:05CV00770-WRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82285, at *20–30 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 9, 2006).
187. Savage v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 06 C 1407, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 9, 2007).
188. See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir. 2002).
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as an oversimplification. 189 Instead, the court chose to focus on discerning the
intent of Congress in its wording of the FLSA and what defines ―work.‖ 190
Even though the Code of Federal Regulations states that the FLSA does not
clearly define ―work,‖191 the court fashioned a definition, then claimed that
Congress intended the word ―work‖ to have the meaning the Plumley court
gave it.192 The court in Plumley largely ignored the clearly expressed intent of
Congress when enacting the FMLA and instead focused on the hypothetical
intent of Congress when enacting the FLSA. 193 Although the Code of Federal
Regulations places the interpretation of the FLSA‘s language squarely within
the discretion of the courts,194 it seems unlikely that Congress would have
written either the FLSA or the FMLA with the notion that the courts would
choose the intent of one act over the intent of another, especially the intent of
the former legislation over the intent of the later-enacted legislation.
If courts want to stay true to the intent and purpose of the FMLA, that is,
to protect families while balancing the needs of both families and employers,
they should interpret the hours of service requirement to include the hours an
employee would have worked but for the wrongful termination. Anything
less will motivate employers to commit egregious acts of FMLA interference
against their employees. This is a violation of the intent of Congress to
protect families‘ economic security.
V. CONCLUSION
The interpretation and application of the FMLA has created confusion for
employees and employers alike as it relates to the wrongfully terminated, and
subsequently reinstated, employee. Despite the confusion, the FMLA is a
valuable piece of legislation for workers and their families, and courts should
interpret the hours worked requirement for the reinstated employee based
upon making the employee whole. An employee who was wrongfully
terminated and then reinstated cannot be made whole without being credited
for the hours he would have worked but for the wrongful termination.
In addition, although the FMLA imposes burdens on employers, those
burdens are not unreasonable in light of the history of employment law and
the goals and purposes Congress sought to meet with the FMLA‘s enactment.
Courts should make decisions consistent with the goals of protecting workers
with families while balancing the needs of employers and employees.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 372 n.6.
Id. at 369.
29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (2006).
See Plumley, 303 F.3d at 370–72.
See id.
29 C.F.R. § 785.2 (2006).
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Interpreting the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement to include the hours an
employee would have worked while he was wrongfully terminated furthers
both the purpose and intent of the FMLA. The needs of employers for a
stable workforce cannot outweigh the needs of employees who would have
met the requirements of the FMLA but for employers‘ initial wrongful
termination.
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